QUICK PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

From What is it like to be a Thermostat? by David Chalmers.

What Lloyd’s approach brings out is that when we try to isolate the kind of processing that is required for conscious experience, the requirements are remarkably hard to pin down, and a careful analysis does not throw up processing criteria that are more than minimal. What are some reasonable-seeming functional criteria for conscious experience? One traditional criterion is reportability, but this is far too strong to be an across-the-board requirement. It seems reasonable to suppose that dogs and cats have conscious experience, even in the absence of an ability to report.

If we seriously discussing panpsychism, why should we think that ‘reportability’ should be a strong requirement? To me, reportability seems very weak.

My cat Gus lets me know he wants to go outside by knocking things off my desk. Gus is letting me know about his current internal state. If it is reasonable to suppose that Gus is having conscience experiences, then ‘wanting to go outside’ is a very likely candidate for an internal state that is associated with a phenomenological experience. So Gus exhibits exactly the sort of behavior we are looking for in an ability to report.

If conscious states, as Chalmers assumes, are functionally independent of linguistic behavior, then there is no reason to assume that reportability as a criteria of consciousness rests on an ability to use language. Gus reports his internal states all the time, in a variety of ways, most of which annoy the shit out of me, and none of which are linguistic, but can very easily be taken as a evidence of an internal conscious state.

Only when reportability is a weak requirement does the possibility of panpsychism become a live option, because its very easy to exhibit behavior that indicates an internal state. The thermostat’s behavior indicates the mechanics of its internal state just as much as Gus’ behavior. Watch someone closely as they fumble with a copy machine and consult with its control panel to find the jammed paper in its labyrinthine innards. Such interactions border on incorrigibility, which is an even stronger (functional?) requirement than reportability.

So tell me: why should reportability be a strong requirement for consciousness?